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K E N N E T H T. PALM ER
M ARCUS LiBRIZZl

D EV ELO PM EN T OF T H E MAINE C O N S T IT U T IO N :
T H E L O N G T R A D IT IO N , 1819-1988
State constitutions are im portant historical docum ents
th ro u g h w hich political and social developm ent can be w it
nessed. T h is is especially true in Maine, one of only nineteen
states that have retained their o rig in al charters. T h e 158
am endm ents in the M aine constitution provide valuable
insight into the critical preoccupations of the past. T h is excep
tionally large body of am endm ents also docum ents the degree
to w hich the structure of the original constitution has been
retained. M aine has been largely successful in preserving its
co n stitu tio n ’s form as well as its “sp irit.” T h is challenge has
been played o u t in the am endm ent process.
Before looking at how the content of M aine’s constitution
has survived 170 years of change, a glance at how the form of
this docum ent has been m aintained seems in order. T h e current
158 am endm ents to the M aine constitution are codified period
ically into the text of the docum ent, instead of ap pearing as
riders at the end of the docum ent as the am endm ents do in the
federal constitution. T h is codification has been conducted by
the chief justice of the M aine Suprem e Judicial C ourt since
1876 (m andated under the 21st am endm ent). T h e intention
behind this process is to keep the charter com prehensible to the
people. For scholars, however, it often necessitates the task of
“dissecting” the constitution into each of its constitutional
resolves.
Because of the codification, the form at of M aine’s current
constitution is the same as the 1819 charter. Both are made u p of
ten articles. W hile retain in g the basic subject m atter of the
original docum ent, each article in the current constitution has
been expanded to encompass the significant am ount of m ate
rial w hich has been added over the years. Despite such accum u
lations, M aine’s charter still reflects the brevity w hich had been
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Augusta during Maine's politically formative years. The evolution of M aine’s consti
tution, through the amendment process, demonstrates the mechanics of adapting
political institutions to changing social and economic needs. Illustration from Maine
Historic Preservation Commission. The Slate House and the Blame House (1981)

one of its original characteristics. T h is has largely been
accom plished because the codification process om its all infor
m ation that has been changed or repealed. In 1986. M aine’s
co nstitution was the twelfth shortest in the U nion. Of the
eleven states w ith shorter charters, the constitutions in only
two of them (Vermont and New H am pshire) predated the
adoption of the M aine instrum ent. T h e other states had either
entered the U n io n after Maine, or had replaced their original
charter. T h u s, M aine has had a m uch longer tim e than most
states to add am endm ents.
M A INE’S C O N S T IT U T IO N IN 1819
As part of the process of gain in g statehood in 1820, M aine
citizens called a C onstitutional Convention in October 1819.
T h e assembly, w hich met at the First Parish M eeting H ouse in
Portland, was com posed of delegates from every incorporated
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town in the D istrict of Maine. Most of these delegates appear to
have earned their livelihood from the sea (shippers, ship
builders, ship captains); the second greatest group of delegates
belonged to the b ar.1Because the state had been part of M assa
chusetts, some delegates felt M aine should rely on the M assa
chusetts constitution as a model.
T here were some, like W illiam King, the state’s first gov
ernor, w ho w anted to strike out independently. Most, however,
seemed to share the opinion of W illiam P itt Preble (delegate
from Saco) w ho felt that the M assachusetts constitution should
be relied upon, if only because the convention lacked “suffi
cient time ... [for] such an am bitious u n d ertak in g ” as drafting
an entirely new co n stitu tio n .2 T h e Massachusetts instrum ent,
w ritten in 1780, w ould become the oldest constitution in the
U nited States. W ritten by Jo h n Adams, it was p ro p h etic in its
political arrangem ents. W hile it stressed the authority of the
legislative body, in keeping w ith the ideology of the American
R evolution, it also set in place a separation of powers system
w hich was less com m on at the time, but w hich w ould become
more widespread.
T h e first of the ten articles w hich made u p M aine’s o rigi
nal constitution was know n as the “ D eclaration of R ig h ts.” At
this time, the U nited States Bill of R ights applied only to the
n atio n al governm ent. It was thus im p o rtan t for states to secure
civil rights in their own charters. M aine’s statem ent of rights
bore m uch resemblance to the national docum ent. Citizens
were guaranteed, am ong other things, free speech, freedom
from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and the right to a
“ speedy, p u b lic a n d im p a rtia l tria l in all c rim in a l
prosecutions.”
T h e M aine constitution also incorporated the language of
the D eclaration of Independence and reflected the grow ing
dem ocratization of American politics follow ing the Revolu
tion. Pow er w ould be in h eren t in the people, in w hose
authority “all free governm ents are founded.” T h e co n stitu 
tion guaranteed citizens the right to institute, alter, or reform
their governm ent “w hen their safety or happiness require it.”
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T h e M aine charter was distinctly more dem ocratic than the
M assachusetts constitution. It protected freedom of w orship,
m a k in g no d istin c tio n between P ro te sta n ts an d R om an
Catholics, G entiles and Jews. T h e 1780 M assachusetts consti
tu tion made it a duty to w orship the “Suprem e B eing,”
required church attendance, and set in place tax discrim ina
tions against Catholics and Jews.
Article II addressed the qualifications for electors. T h e
docum ent provided for universal suffrage for all males over 21
years, excepting “ paupers, persons under guardianship, ...
Indians not taxed,” and persons w ho had not lived for three
m onths in the state. T h e Massachusetts constitution required
an estate of sixty pounds as a condition for voting, alth o u g h
this had not been enforced strictly. As in civil rights, suffrage
qualifications reflected grow ing dem ocratization in early
nineteenth-century politics.
Articles III, IV, V, VI dealt w ith the structure of the state
governm ent. Article III established the principle of separation
of powers, w hile Article IV concerned itself w ith the structure
of the M aine Legislature. T h e 1819 C onvention decided not to
replicate the M assachusetts system of allo ttin g one representa
tive to every incorporated town, w hich by the early 1800s had
created a “G reat and G eneral C o u rt” of over 700 members.
Instead, representation was based on population.
Article IV apportioned the Senate sim ilarly. T h e M assa
chusetts constitution allocated senators to counties according
to the counties’ wealth. T his meant that the coastal counties
aro u n d Boston had an advantage over western M assachusetts
and the District of Maine. T h e third part of Article IV refined
some legislative practices. An effort toward dem ocratization
was again reflected in stipulations such as the requirem ent of
the H ouse to “keep a jo u rn a l” and “from time to time [to]
p u b lish its proceedings.”
Article V dealt w ith the governorship. T h e convention
here followed the Massachusetts charter which, unlike the early
constitutions of many states, provided for a strong governor.
T h e M aine governor was the only elected statewide official, and
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Portland’s First Parish Meetinghouse, site of the stale’s 1820 Constitutional Conven
tion. Convention leaders borrowed from the 1780 Massachusetts constitution* but
produced a distinctly more democratic document, particularly in the area of religious
freedom.

he had considerable appointive powers, including the power to
nam e the attorney general (a power later transferred to the
Legislature). T h e governor also enjoyed a veto power, rela
tively rare in the first state constitutions.
T h e m ain lim itation on the governor’s pow er was the
convention’s decision to install an Executive Council. T h at
council, consisting of seven members elected by the L egisla
ture, was em powered to “advise the governor in the executive
part of governm ent.” T h e Executive Council was a vestige of
Revolutionary suspicion of centralized power. A lthough the
idea for the council came from the Massachusetts constitution,
there was debate over its inclusion in M aine’s 1819 charter. Dr.
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Rose of Boothbay claim ed it w ould be a useless expense, creat
in g only “a council in w hom he (the governor) has no confi
dence.” 3 Advocates of the council stressed the advantages of
economy, p o in tin g out that a council could also be made to
serve as an au d itin g departm ent to review the treasurer’s
accounts. T h e advocates won and M aine had an Executive
C ouncil un til 1975.
Ironically, the Executive Council was originally an asset
to the governor w hen he was still the k in g ’s governor. In
colonial America, the interests of the king, his governor, and
the small coterie of wealthy colonialists w ho com posed the
council were largely the same. Occasionally, however, the
council took the pru d en t step of siding against the governor
and w ith the m ore radical lower House, associated w ith the
people. D u rin g the R evolution, the council came to be
regarded as an advocate of the people.4
T h e council could become even more of an obstacle w hen
the governor3s party was not the one in control of the Legisla
ture. Frequent efforts were to appear over the years to abolish
the council — by the C onstitutional Com m issions of 1875 and
1962, by G overnor E dm und Muskie, and by the D emocratic
Party for decades. M uch of the controversy over the council and
its functions arose from the problem atic language w ith in the
orig in al text, w hich said the council was to “advise” the gover
nor “ for ordering and directing the affairs of state.” Ju st w hat
was intended by these terms was left largely unspecified. T h is
am biguity led to fluctuations in the council’s actual pow er
d u rin g different adm inistrations. It also made the council diffi
cult to attack.
Article VI delegated judicial power to a Suprem e Judicial
C ourt and to “ such other courts as the L egislature shall ...
establish.” Justices were to be nam ed by the governor, and they
held their offices “d u rin g good behavior” u n til the age of
seventy. Except for the age lim it, these provisions closely fol
lowed those in the Massachusetts constitution.
T h e rem aining articles dealt w ith the role of the state in the
education of its citizens (in part, prom pted by a pow er struggle
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over control of Bowdoin College w hich the state then helped to
fund)5, the organization of the state m ilitia, and various house
keeping matters. In a referendum in December 1819, the consti
tution was approved by a m argin of more than ten to one.
T w o underlying themes of the 1819 constitution were rela
tively broad p o p u lar p articipation and a state governm ent
equipped w ith fairly extensive powers. Not all state consitutions at that time provided either as m uch respect to individual
citizens or as m uch strength to the three branches of state
governm ent. M aine’s suffrage was broader than that of Massa
chusetts, and its ‘‘D eclaration of R ig h ts’’ m ore elaborate. At the
same time, the co n stitu tio n did not follow the paths of some
other states and w eigh the state governm ent alm ost entirely in
the direction of its Legislature. It is true that in M aine the
Legislature was the first branch of governm ent, but the gover
nor and the courts were also given significant powers. As the
state developed and began to alter its constitution through
am endm ents, the tension between the pow er given to the peo
ple and the pow er given to the governm ent had to be co n tin u 
ally reconciled.

THE DIRECTION OF THE AMENDMENTS
Because of the large num ber of am endm ents to M aine’s
constitution, and the even greater range of subjects w hich they
attem pt to shape, a classification of the am endm ents is neces
sary for o u r u n derstanding of them. T hree broad areas w ill be
examined: social policy, suffrage, and political institutions.
Social policy
M aine’s use of constitutional am endm ents to establish
social policy invites attention to the 26th am endm ent which, in
1885, “forever p ro h ib ited ” the use of intoxicating liquor. T h is
am endm ent was the outgrow th of a pow erful tem perance
movement in Maine, led by Neal Dow, a P ortland businessm an
who became involved in the issue through his p h ilan th ro p y .6
By the 1850s, his movement won legislative enactm ent of a
p ro h ib itio n law w hich w ould become know n as the “M aine
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L aw ” because it was so widely copied by other states. Because of
D em ocratic o p p o sitio n to P rohibition, the policy rested on an
uncertain foundation so long as it depended on a statute. Dow
and his followers sought to provide a more secure basis for it
w ith a constitutional am endm ent. Indeed, the 26th am endm ent
was effective u n til it was repealed in 1934 under the 54th
am endm ent.
A nother im portant am endm ent aim ed at social policy is
the 14th am endm ent. Passed in 1876, this act prom ised that
charters of incorporation w ould not be created under special
legislation, but under general laws. T h e general incorporation
law came at the culm ination of a long era of national contro
versy lasting roughly from the 1830s to the 1880s. A staple of
Jacksonian politics was the reaction against legislative power,
p opularly viewed as corrupt and beholden to pow erful cap ital
ists. U nder the rubric of egalitariansim , citizens launched a
series of attacks against charters, im m unity, m onopoly, and
special legislation.
In M aine, the controversy over special legislation lasted
from the 1830s un til the 14th am endm ent was passed in 1876.
Proponents of the am endm ent assumed that privilege, favorit
ism, and m onopoly w ould be w iped o u t once special legisla
tion was replaced by general laws of incorporation. U nder
general incorporation laws, they felt, sim ilar petitions for
inco rp o ratio n w ould be given sim ilar privileges. In addition,
advocates hoped that the integrity of the L egislature could be
reaffirmed, if not altogether redeemed.7
In 1870, the Legislature passed a general incorporation
law for private corporations, or those w hich were in no way
affected w ith p ublic interest. In January 1871, the Maine
Farmer praised the statute but predicted that private legislation
w ould continue unless there w ould be a “ ... clause in the
constitution forbidding the enactm ent of any but general
laws. ”8T h e paper's p rem onition was correct, and few corpora
tions were formed under the new statute u n til it became em 
bodied in the 14th am endm ent.
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In proposing the 14th am endm ent, M aine’s Legislature
significantly delim ited the scope of its ow n actions, but p er
haps n ot as dram atically as one m ight at first suppose. T h e case
of Taylor v. Portsmouth, Kittery, £r York Railroad (91 M aine
193, 1898) established the rule of law that if the Legislature
should grant a special charter w hich m ight have been formed
under general laws, only the state (not private citizens) can
inquire into such an act’s validity.9
T h e issues behind the 14th and 26th am endm ents success
fully tapped into the m oral and egalitarian political culture of
M aine, w hich had been founded on the P u ritan concept of
society. O ne issue (temperance) was indigenous to Maine, and
the other (special legislation) was not. But the political climate
w ithin M aine at the time strengthened these movements by
establishing constitutional guarantee. T h e passage of the two
am endm ents, in turn, points to one reason for constant m odifi
cation of a state constitution: the need to substantiate psycho
logically an already existing law. Both the 14th and 26th
am endm ents existed in statutory form, but proponents felt they
w ould be given greater validity by being incorporated into the
constitution. T h e am endm ents also support the idea that on
big issues, M aine has always attem pted to speak w ith one voice.
T h ro u g h o u t the tw entieth century, civil rights in M aine
have been expanded through constitutional am endm ents. In
1954, the 77th am endm ent allowed Indians in the state to vote,
regardless of w hether or not they paid taxes. A lthough the 89th
am endm ent provided M aine’s citizens w ith the basic tenets of
civil rights in 1963, w ithin two years the 100th am endm ent was
required so that paupers m ight have suffrage rights. A nother
anti-discrim inatory measure was the 79th am endm ent (1955),
w hich removed the requirem ent that the governor had to be a
natural-born citizen of the United States. In November 1988,
voters approved an am endm ent to remove all sexist language
from the constitution.
Suffrage
T he second broad area of constitutional change has
involved the suffrage. W hen M aine’s constitution was written,
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the states had sole power to determ ine w hich persons w ould
vote. G radually, the federal governm ent began to circumscribe
state pow er in this area through am endm ents to the federal
constitution, such as those g ran tin g suffrage to blacks and to
w om en. M aine nevertheless enacted some im p o rta n t and
u n iq u e suffrage am endm ents. A lthough most of these am end
m ents appeared d u rin g the n ineteenth century and early
decades of the tw entieth century, some were passed fairly
recently.
D uring the last half of the nineteenth century, suffrage
am endm ents were m ainly focused on new ways of electing state
officials. In the original constitution, the w in n in g candidate
for either the L egislature or governorship was required to
obtain a clear majority of all votes cast in the particu lar elec
tion. If no candidate had a m ajority, additional procedures
were required according to the office being filled.
W hen splinter parties evolved in the 1830s and 1840s, the
m ajority system of elections broke down. In the 1846 H ouse
elections in M aine, some 40 percent of the districts had no
m ajority w inners and required additional contests. T h e techni
cal solution to the problem was the plu rality elections, in
w hich the candidate w ith the highest num ber of votes (whether
or not a m ajority) is declared the w inner. In 1848, voters
approved the 7th am endm ent w hich established this procedure
for the H ouse of Representatives. (They rejected this idea for
other offices.)
In 1868 and 1872, elections for certain Senate seats had to
be held a second tim e because of the absence of a m ajority
w inner. In 1876, the 13th am endm ent was enacted to establish
the plurality rule for senatorial elections. T h e governor,
though, was still chosen by a required m ajority vote. In one of
these elections, the Legislature chose a candidate w ho had not
even obtained a plurality. T h e candidate, Dr. Alonzo G arcelon
(1879-1880) of Lewiston, was elected by a fusion of the Demo
cratic and G reenback parties. Before G arcelon left office, how 
ever, the 24th am endm ent was passed, establishing plurality
elections for governor.

135

Alonzo Garcelon, Democrat icGreenback candidate for governor,
lacked a popular plurality in 1879. but
was elected by the Legislature. This
contest sparked a storm of protest and
prompted a constitutional amendment
requiring plurality election. Courtesy
University of Maine Special Collec
tions Department.

GOV O F M AINE iftto.

T h e 29th am endm ent, passed in 1893, was criticized as
being nativist. It was the outgrow th of a late-nineteenthcentury change in M aine’s dem ography. T h e p o p ulation of
M aine had become far m ore ethnically diverse than it had been
originally. Into the predom inately A nglo-Saxon/Scots Irish
stock of the early settlers, incursions were made by the ErancoAmericans after the Civil War, and by eastern and southern
Europeans around the turn of the century. In Maine, as in other
states, the im m igration resulted in a period of adjustm ent for
both the newcomers and the natives. T h e 29th am endm ent
appears to be one negative exam ple of native adjustm ent. T h is
measure required that voters be able to read the M aine consti
tution in E nglish as well as write their names. Previously
enrolled voters were exempted. Resentment to the am endm ent
was especially strong in the large, ethnically conscious French
com m unities, such as Lew iston.10
T h e first two decades of the twentieth century witnessed
some dram atic strides in suffrage, the most notable being the
Susan B. A nthony am endm ent to the federal constitution in
1919, allow ing women to vote. A lthough M aine had a vocal
suffrage organization as early as 1873, every w om en's suffrage
bill that was subm itted failed. O ne reason for the failure seems
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to have been that the p ro h ib itio n issue became intertw ined
w ith the w om en’s suffrage movement. Many Democrats and
“w et” R epublicans seem to have feared that if w om en obtained
the vote, the 26th (prohibition) am endm ent m ight never be
repealed.11 A nother factor was the presence of the M aine Asso
ciation O pposed to Suffrage for W omen, led by M argaret R ol
lins H ale, a p ro m in en t civic leader m arried to Ju d g e Clarence
Hale.
A lthough M aine was behind the times in its stand against
w om en voting (even on local school boards), it was the first
eastern state to confer u p o n its electors the Direct Initiative and
Referendum , under the 31st am endm ent in 1909.12 T h e In itia 
tive allow ed the electors to draw u p statutes w ith o u t legislative
consent. T h e Referendum allowed them to veto measures
already enacted by the Legislature, as well as approve new
initiatives.
T he 31st am endm ent grew o u t of the political ferment of
the Progressive period, a time w hen citizens in M aine and many
states considered themselves more capable of sound political
decisions than their elected officials. Shortly after the turn of
the century, the Initiative and Referendum became a p art of the
Dem ocratic platform in Maine. T h e proposed D em ocratic
Initiative em braced constitutional am endm ents as well as
statutes. Sim ilar measures were endorsed by the R epublican
and P ro h ib itio n parties by 1906, alth o u g h these two parties
successfully barred use of the Initiative to am end the co n stitu 
tion. (The P ro h ib itio n Party feared that w ithout that restric
tion the In itiativ e m ight lead to the removal of the 26th
am endm ent b an n in g liq u o r.)13
Despite the form idable opposition of the speaker of the
house, the president of the senate, and the members of the
judiciary com m ittee, to w hom the proposal was subm itted,
support was still strong. T he Legislature passed a resolve
w hich was overw helm ingly ratified by the voters in the follow 
ing year.
Since then, the Initiative and Referendum have been used
fairly frequently, especially in recent years. Partly because of
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this, a trend restricting the use of these devices is discernible.
A dditional signatures for the Initiative and Referendum were
required under the 63rd and 71st am endm ents by the early
1950s. D uring the same period, the 72nd am endm ent was
passed, stip u latin g that any measure adopted through referen
dum w hich failed to provide adequate revenues for its ser
vices w ould be inoperative. Still another provision, enacted
under the 144th am endm ent in 1981, specified that no signature
on a petition older than one year w ould be regarded as valid.
These restrictions are apparently designed to prevent small
num bers of voters and interest groups from m an ip u latin g the
Referendum and Initiative process to their advantage.
T he latter half of the tw entieth century has (somewhat
belatedly) removed some of the earlier restrictive suffrage
am endm ents. It was only in 1954 that all of the state’s Indians
were allowed to vote under the 77th am endm ent. Paupers were
denied this right until the 100th am endm ent in 1965. In eq u ita
ble legislative ap p o rtio n m en t was not corrected u n til 1969
through the 88th and 110th amendments. T h e voting age was
lowered to twenty by the 113th am endm ent (1969), and then to
eighteen by the 116th am endm ent (1971). In addition, residency
requirem ents for voting that were increased d u rin g the G reat
Depression (am endm ents 57 and 61) were removed in 1974,
under the 123rd am endm ent.

Political Institutions
T h e im pact of the am endm ent process on the three
branches of M aine’s governm ent is the last area to be examined.
M aine created a strong Legislature through the provisions of
its original constitution, and over the years this branch of
governm ent has acquired additional strength. T h e bulk of the
am endm ents extending legislative power have been budgetary
in nature, concerned especially w ith the issuance of bonds and
the level of the debt ceiling. Most of them constitute an excep
tion to the 6th am endm ent of 1848, the m ost restrictive of all
measures placed on the Legislature. T his am endm ent forbade
the loaning of state credit and lim ited the state debt to $300,000.
T he original docum ent had not set a debt lim it.
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It is im p o rta n t to realize that the 6th am endm ent was not
established w ith the sole intention of circum scribing the pow 
ers of the state legislature. T h is am endm ent was the result of
serious financial difficulties w hich the state found itself in
d u rin g the 1840s. T h ese difficulties grew o u t of several
circumstances.
T h e depression of 1837 was pivotal. A rising from excessive
speculation and too m uch currency in circulation, this busi
ness crisis had far-reaching effects for M aine, still in the early
days of statehood. At the time, the state opposed the principle of
direct taxation, considering it, as in the words of its treasurer in
1836, “ the most odious and ... expensive way of sustaining the
governm ent. ’114 Revenues were instead based on sales of pu b lic
lands — sales w hich dram atically sloughed off w hen the spec
ulative boom in M aine tim berlands ended in 1837. T w o years
later, in 1839, the N ortheastern Boundary D ispute between
G reat B ritain and the U nited States clim axed in a m uster of
state m ilitia, w hich cost M aine in one year an am o u n t over six
times its revenue. T o sustain the northern forts and troops, the
state eventually created a debt of $1.5 m illion, borrow ing on
w hat one scholar has described as “ruinous term s.” 15
By 1840, the state had reluctantly instituted direct taxation
(a property tax), and w ith in two years began reducing the
deficit. In enacting the 6th am endm ent in 1848, M aine made a
serious prom ise, intended to be m ore of a guideline th an a
practice. It is difficult to say w hether the prom ise n o t to loan
the state’s credit has been invalidated by the m any exceptions
(in the form of bond issues) that have been enacted over the
years, such as 45th am endm ent w hich allow ed the state’s credit
to be loaned for soldiers’ bonuses after W orld W ar I. But the fact
that an exception to the 6th am endm ent is necessary whenever
the state’s credit is loaned provides a significant dose of
caution.
M aine’s C on stitu tio n al Com m ission of 1875 had an im 
p o rtan t effect on the Legislature in several ways. T h e C om m is
sion was responsible for the 14th am endm ent, w hich re
stricted the L egislature by providing for general, rather than
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special, acts of incorporation for businesses. But the C om m is
sion was also responsible for some of the most im p o rtan t pow 
ers given to the L egislature in the nineteenth century. A m ong
these is the 19th am endm ent, w hich allowed the Legislature to
call a constitutional convention in order to am end the constitu
tion, and the 20th, w hich gave the L egislature the right to
suspend (for ten years) the suffrage rights of individuals
involved in electoral bribery. R egarding the L egislature’s
pow er of taxation, the 17th am endm ent prom ised that this
right w ould never be surrendered.
D uring the tw entieth century, the state’s Legislature has
seen a num ber of procedural restrictions placed u p o n its fin an 
cial powers. A m ong these, the 75th am endm ent (1951) required
that statem ents of the state’s o u tstanding debts m ust accom
pany all proposals to the electors for the issuance of new state
bonds. O ther am endm ents are the 147th (1982) and the 151st
(1984) w hich lim it the life of authorized bonds. In a sense, these
am endm ents recall the tenor of earlier constitutional reforms,
w hich ensured financial stability through constitutional re
strictions on the Legislature. T h e 115th am endm ent (1970),
however, gave the L egislature one of its m ost im p o rtan t pow 
ers. T h is am endm ent allows the L egislature to convene itself
in to special sessions, a right formerly enjoyed by the governor
only.
M aine’s executive branch has also been modified through
the am endm ent process. In the original C onstitution, the gov
ernor had extensive appointive powers, w hich included the
n am in g of judicial, civilian, and m ilitary personnel. By the
m iddle of the nineteenth century the executive power in most
states was under attack, and M aine was no exception. In 1856,
under W hig sponsorship, several of the governor’s appointive
offices were made subject to popular election (9th am endm ent).
These included judges, registers of probate, m unicipal judges,
and county sheriffs.
B eginning in the 1870s, state politicians began to recon
sider some of their earlier decisions against executive power.
T his was partly because certain officials were responsible to a
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governor w ho had no direct influence over their selection. In
M aine, this new th in k in g resulted in the cancellation of p o r
tions of the 9th am endm ent. Under the 16th am endm ent (1876),
the ap p o in tm en t of judges of m u n icip al and police courts
reverted to the governor, w ho later was allow ed to ap p o in t the
ad ju tan t and quarter-m aster generals under the 28th am end
m ent (1893).
It was d u rin g the tw entieth century that the governorship
in M aine received some of its most im p o rtan t powers. T he 38th
am endm ent, adopted in 1917, allow ed the governor to remove
county sheriffs in certain instances. As the official m ost respon
sible for carrying o u t the laws of the state, the governor needed
this direct au th o rity over sheriffs, w ho were the m ain law
enforcem ent agents in their respective counties. U nder the 40th
am endm ent (1919), the governor gained the power to ap p o in t
com m issioned m ilitia officers, w ho had earlier been nam ed by
their com panies. In 1929, the 50th am endm ent authorized the
governor to fill vacancies in the Executive C ouncil ' ‘w ith the
advice and consent’* of the Council, instead of by the jo in t
ballot of the Legislature.
T here have been some critical additions to the G overnor’s
authority w ith in the past three decades. In 1955, the 78th
am endm ent extended the governor s pardon powers, and two
years later, under the 84th am endm ent, the governor’s term was
extended from two years to four. In 1975, the Executive Council
was abolished by the 129th am endm ent. Its executive functions,
such as pow ers of fiscal m anagem ent, were assigned to the
governor, w hile such legislative activities as confirm ing guber
natorial nom inations were lodged in the Senate. In the follow 
in g year, the 131st am endm ent gave the governor ten days to act
on legislation, instead of the earlier five.
W hile m any states have incorporated into their constitu
tions specifications concerning the structure of their executive
branch, M aine’s docum ent says relatively little on the matter.
T h e attorney g eneral’s ap p o in tm en t has been altered (9th
am endm ent, 1856) and the state treasurer has gained a longer
term of office (27th, 1889 and 70th, 1951). T h e L and Agency was

141

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAINE CONSTITUTION

abolished in the nineteenth century and the office of justice of
the peace was removed from the constitution in the tw entieth
century. M ost of the broad changes, from a h an d fu l of
employees in the 1820s to the approxim ately 12,000 employees
currently in the workforce, came through statutory revision.
Of the three branches of state governm ent, the least
am ount of constitutional revision has occurred w ith respect to
the state courts. W ith the grow th of judicial business, the
Legislature has been able to establish new courts and new levels
of courts w ithout resorting to the am endm ent process. T h e
only court officially sanctioned by the state constitution is the
Suprem e Judicial Court. T h e m ain changes that have occurred
in that court th ro u g h constitutional am endm ent have been
concerned w ith judicial tenure.
O rig in a lly , as noted, ju stices served “ d u rin g good
behavior” u n til the age of seventy. In 1840, under the 3rd
am endm ent, they were given seven-year terms, and the ban
concerning age was removed. U nder the 132nd am endm ent
(1976), justices were allowed to serve up to six m onths after the
expiration of their term, if a successor had not been named.
A final aspect of governm ental institutions has to do w ith
the developm ent of relations between the state governm ent and
its localities. Like local governm ents in all states, M aine’s
towns and cities are in constitutional theory “creatures of the
state.” T h e state may direct their actions as it desires and its
powers include the authority to create, modify, and abolish
local governm ental jurisdictions. T h e original M aine C onsti
tution was silent on the topic of state and local relations, but
several am endm ents have significantly shaped this relatio n 
ship. In 1878, the 22nd am endm ent barred m unicipalities from
creating debts exceeding five percent of their property valua
tions. T h e Maine Legislature had earlier allowed localities to
sell a lim ited am ount of bonds for the purpose of constructing
railroads. Pressures on the Legislature to further relax the
credit lim itations on individual com m unities were so intense
that the am endm ent was adopted to regulate the situation
across the state.
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If the 22nd am endm ent was restrictive, the 111th am end
m ent (1969) provided localities w ith their m ost im portant new
pow er by g ran tin g hom e rule to M aine’s m unicipalities. Under
its provisions, local inhabitants were given the power to alter or
am end their charters on all local matters that were not p ro h i
bited by constitutional or general law. T h is am endm ent illu s
trates the reserve characteristic of M aine policym aking. A l
th o u g h the hom e-rule m ovem ent started in the 1870s in
M issouri, it only became nationally p o p u la r at the turn of the
century. At this time, m unicipalities in m any states were given
freedom in all ‘"local m atters.” Exactly w hat was purely local in
nature, however, was often left so vague that little pow er was
actually granted. By the 1950s, the hom e-rule movem ent was at
its peak. T h e form ula that allow ed com m unities to pass
ordinances on "local m atters” was widely replaced w ith one
that perm itted them to alter their charters in all m atters "n o t
p ro h ib ited ” by constitutional or statutory law. T h is altered
w ording gave considerably more substance to the power of
home-rule. In M aine, hom e-rule arrived late, and both the old
and the new versions were entered in the constitution.
T h e 157 am endm ents added to the M aine C onstitution
since its adoption in 1819 have significantly strengthened the
original political structure. T h e im p o rtan t freedoms and pow 
ers that M aine citizens acquired in their original charter have
been expanded by constitutional am endm ents through the
years. W hile it is true that the most significant of these am end
ments were enacted d u rin g the nineteenth century and early
decades of the tw entieth, there have been some critical addi
tions more recently — such as the 89th am endm ent (1963)
g ran tin g basic civil rights. T h e Legislature, w hich started as
the strongest political body, has m aintained its independence
th ro u g h the am endm ent process. T h e nineteenth century w it
nessed the greatest am o u n t of am endm ent activity concerning
the Legislature. A lthough the tw entieth century has seen many
procedural lim itations p u t on this institution, there have been
some signal acquisitions, such as the 115th am endm ent (1970)
w hich allow ed the Legislature to convene itself into special
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sessions. U nlike the case of many states d u rin g the early n in e
teenth century, M aine’s governorship was initially strong.
Except for a tem porary period in the m iddle of that century, the
office has continued to develop that way. Its greatest period of
grow th has been, w ithout doubt, the tw entieth century, espe
cially the most recent decades.
A salient feature of M aine politics is that it has been able to
reconcile two potentially clashing elements — the need for
effective governm ent and the benefits of a politically active
citizenry. In part this was accomplished through the am end
ments themselves. Amendm ents that enlarged or restricted the
power of a single branch of governm ent usually contained a
clause that redressed the balance, or subsequent am endm ents
did so. For instance, w hile the Legislature has acquired powers
to issue bonds (thereby eroding the 6th am endm ent), these
powers have been more recently restricted. Even though the
general incorporation laws of the 14th am endm ent have
severely curtailed legislative power, only the state is em pow 
ered to look into any deviations from this policy. T h e Direct
Initiative and Referendum of the 31st am endm ent gave the
people of M aine an im p o rtan t power, but this power has been
circum scribed th roughout the second half of the tw entieth
century. A lthough the 9th am endm ent (1856) removed many
appointive offices from the governor, subsequent am endm ents,
such as the 16th and the 28th, have returned m any of the same
offices to the governor.
As a result of such reconciliation and balance, the “sp irit”
of the 1819 constitution has largely been retained and made
relevant to changing circumstances. T h ro u g h codification, the
original form at of the docum ent has also been m aintained. T h e
preservation of M aine’s constitution, then, has not been in the
form of a m useum piece. Instead, the charter is constantly
re-evaluated through the am endm ent process. It is in this
respect that the M aine constitution is an accom plishm ent. T h e
charter thus continues as both a testim ony to the past and a
direction for tomorrow.
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